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The notoriously conservative Supreme Court returned some surprising victories for employees, women, and 
families during the October, 2003 term.1 Its most notable employment decision was in Nevada Department of 
Human Resources v. Hibbs,2 a case exploring whether the Family and Medical Leave Act, a federal statute 
mandating unpaid leave for employees who need it because of illness or caregiving responsibilities, protects state 
government employees.   
 
A second important case, Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,3 resolved a long-brewing split among federal 
appellate courts about the proof requirements in so-called “mixed motive” discrimination cases—those in which an 
adverse employment action (such as a firing, demotion, or failure to hire) occurs for both legitimate and illegitimate 
reasons.   
 
Both of these cases provide meaningful protection against discrimination for at least some employees. 
Importantly, they reverse a notable trend towards contracting the federal anti-discrimination rights of employees that 
had emerged over recent Court terms. 
 
The Hibbs Case 
 
Enacted in 1993, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) requires employers with at least fifty employees to 
provide up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave for childbirth, new parenting responsibilities, illness, or the need to care 
for a sick family member.4 Because the leave is unpaid, what this means for the employee is that he or she can keep 
participating in a group health plan (if there is one); has the right not to be retaliated against for taking the leave; and 
has the right to be reinstated after the leave period. 
 
The question for the Court in Hibbs was whether state governments must abide by the FMLA when dealing 
with their own employees. William Hibbs, the plaintiff in the case, was an employee in the Welfare Division of the 
Nevada Department of Human Resources, a unit of Nevada’s state government.  He sought unpaid leave from his 
job to care for his ailing wife.   
 
Nevada granted him the leave under FMLA, as well as under a “catastrophic leave” policy, but later fired 
him anyway.  (The parties disputed, among other points, whether the two kinds of leave should be concurrent or 
consecutive.) Hibbs sued under the FMLA, but Nevada argued for dismissal because of the sovereign immunity 
provided by the Eleventh Amendment.  The trial court agreed with Nevada, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit agreed with Hibbs.5 The seven other appellate courts to consider this or a similar issue reached a 
different conclusion than the Ninth Circuit.6  
  
The Supreme Court rejected Nevada’s claim of immunity. The Eleventh Amendment provides states (and 
state agencies) with immunity from suits for money damages brought in federal court, whether the claims are based 
on state or federal law.  The only exceptions occur if a state voluntarily waives immunity or Congress abrogates that 
immunity. 
 
To validly abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, Congress must first unequivocally express its 
intent to do so, which it clearly did in the FMLA. The FMLA expressly authorizes suits against any “public agency” 
in federal or state court, and defines “public agency” to include state governments and their subdivisions.7 Second, 
Congress must act pursuant to a valid exercise of power. This question – on which the appellate courts before Hibbs 
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had divided – is far trickier, and depends on the power under which the legislation is passed. The Court has held, for 
instance, that Congress does not have the authority to abrogate immunity when it acts pursuant to Article I of the 
Constitution, but it does have that authority when it acts pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.   
 
Section 5 gives Congress the “power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions” of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees, among other things, the equal protection the laws, and thus has been the 
source of a number of anti-discrimination statutes.8  The Court has said that Section 5 allows Congress to enact 
statutes prohibiting unconstitutional behavior by the states. And the legislative history of the FMLA contains plain 
statements that Congress was drawing at lease in part on its power under Section 5.   
 
But in this case, the Constitution did not guarantee twelve weeks leave (as the FMLA does), so simply 
denying that period of leave was not inherently unconstitutional. In addition, it might not be unconstitutional for a 
workplace to give greater maternity leave than paternity leave, since biological mothers have to recover from 
childbirth, and fathers, obviously, do not.  But the FMLA gives both sexes twelve weeks equally.  
 
The Court has also said, however, that Section 5 empowers Congress to enact statutes that prohibit 
otherwise constitutional behavior – such as, here, denying twelve weeks of leave – to the extent necessary to prevent 
and deter unconstitutional conduct. To do so, however, Congress must both act based on a history of constitutional 
violations and design a remedy that is both proportional and congruent to the identified injury. Thus the crux of 
Hibbs was whether the FMLA was enacted in response to a history of state-sponsored sex discrimination and, if so, 
whether it was an appropriate response to that history.   
 
The Court held that because the FMLA was a valid enactment under Section 5, Nevada’s claim of 
sovereign immunity had to be rejected and Hibbs’ right to sue his employer upheld.  Drawing in part on a brief filed 
by women’s history scholars, the Court found evidence of a long history of state-sponsored discrimination through 
laws, formal workplace policies, and informal practices. For the better part of the Twentieth Century, states enacted 
and maintained laws that had the purpose or effect of limiting the rights of working women.  Illinois refused to 
permit women to act as lawyers.9 Michigan refused to allow women to tend bar.10 Oregon limited the number of 
hours women could do wage-earning work.11 Florida encouraged women to avoid jury service on the theory that it 
would interfere with their duties as mothers.12   
 
Repeatedly, when women tried to seek relief from the U.S. Supreme Court, it turned them away – making 
the Court’s own recognition of this discrimination all the more significant as an implicit repudiation of past Court 
mistakes. Even today, Congress found evidence that states continue to rely on outmoded gender stereotypes in the 
workplace. And these stereotypes are particularly strong with respect to the administration of caregiving and 
parental leave.   
 
States, the record showed, like private sector employers, tended to utilize policies that created and 
perpetuated a society in which women are largely responsible for family caretaking either because leave was only 
available to women or because no leave was available. Either way, they furthered the stereotype of women as 
primarily responsible for family caregiving needs, parental or otherwise. Denying paternity leave but allowing 
maternity leave (beyond any actual period of disability associated with childbirth) assumes that men are not 
interested in child care, and, even if they are interested, gives them no opportunity to act on that interest. The whole 
burden of caregiving thus falls on women if men do not have access to leave. Meanwhile, offering no leave at all 
tends to force women to quit in order to become full- or part-time caretakers. In either case, women become less 
attractive to employers because they are likely to cost more, and stay for less time.       
 
All told, the Court concluded, states committed acts of sex discrimination against female employees based 
on “pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is women’s work.”13 This evidence was sufficient, 
in the Court’s opinion, to prove an actual constitutional violation that Congress could validly counteract.14 Sex 
discrimination by a state government is an obvious violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. (Similar acts by private employers do not violate the Constitution.)   
 
The Court also found that the FMLA directly combats sex discrimination—a necessary component of its 
Eleventh Amendment analysis. First, since most caretakers are women, it improves the chance that women can 
continue earning wages despite family responsibilities (as men have always been able to do). Second, it allows men 
to take leave and share the caregiving responsibilities, rather than leaving them solely to women.  
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By equalizing leave for both sexes, the Court said, the FMLA “attacks the formerly state-sanctioned 
stereotype that only women are responsible for family caregiving.”15  In addition, it targets the “fault line between 
work and family,” where “sex-based generalization has been and remains strongest.”16  The Court thus ruled for 
Hibbs and held that the FMLA could constitutionally be applied to the states.   
 
This decision represents an ironic victory from a staunchly anti-federal Supreme Court. It holds promise for 
sex equality by giving effect to the FMLA’s guarantee of sex-neutral leave for caregiving. In so doing, it should 
eliminate any disincentive for employers to hire women.  In addition, it should encourage fathers to become more 
involved in caregiving. More broadly, through these measures, the FMLA seeks to promote equality between 
women and men as workers, and between women and men as parents. 
 
But while this decision is a clear victory, it is a relatively small one, given the practical limitations on its 
effectiveness. First, the FMLA’s fifty-employee threshold excludes almost half of the American workforce.  Second, 
the FMLA guarantees only unpaid leave, which most workers cannot afford to take. The same workers who cannot 
afford to hire a caregiver also cannot afford to take unpaid leave: for them, quitting may still seem like the only 
option. Even for employees who do work for big companies, and can afford to take leave – such as women 
executives striving to break “glass ceilings”—the FMLA is often no help. The statute permits an employer to deny 
restoration of a job to its most highly paid employees if it can prove that holding the job open will inflict “substantial 
and grievous economic injury” on the employer’s operations.17   
 
Meanwhile, in reality, men, by and large, do not take FMLA leave – or any other type of leave – for 
purposes of caring for a child or sick family member.  And that means the FMLA cannot really fulfill its potential. 
One theory of the FMLA is that when men and women are both allowed to take equal caretaking leaves, they will be 
equally likely to be caregivers and thus become equally (un)attractive as employees.18 But the cultural and financial 
disincentives to paternal leave-taking are powerful enough to make this ideal fall flat. The numbers are stark—
almost no men take leave, even if it is available, and those who do average a leave of four to five days.   
 
The FMLA’s goals are certainly laudable, and this preservation of the statute a positive sign. But greater 
advances in sex equality will have to come from elsewhere.   
 
The Desert Palace case 
 
A second victory for employees came in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,19 in which the Supreme Court resolved a 
dispute among federal courts of appeals about how to treat “mixed motive” discrimination cases – that is, cases in 
which an adverse employment action (such as a firing, demotion, or failure to hire) occurs for both legitimate and 
illegitimate reasons.   
 
The case was brought by Catherina Costa, who was fired from her job as a warehouse worker and heavy 
equipment operator – the only woman in that job. She sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Costa alleged that 
her firing was an act of sex discrimination.  After a physical altercation with a male co-worker, she was fired. He, in 
contrast, only received a short suspension. Based on this disparity in discipline, other alleged acts of discrimination, 
and claims of sexual harassment, Costa sued. Her employer, however, points to Costa’s documented history of 
disciplinary problems and claims the firing was its response to this history; she was a “problem” employee, it 
argues.  
 
Both Costa and her employer may be telling the truth – Costa’s history on the job, as well as her gender, 
may have played a role in her firing. Whether the jury should get to decide this case, and, how they should be 
instructed, turns on the proper understanding of mixed-motive discrimination, a complicated issue relating to 
burdens of proof. 
 
In 1973, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,20 the Supreme Court made clear how burdens of proof and 
production work in a discrimination case. (A “burden of proof” is the standard for how persuasive the proof of a 
claim must be.  In contrast, a “burden of production” is not a burden to persuade; rather, it is a burden to come 
forward with at least some evidence.)  
 
First, the plaintiff must make out a “prima facie” case, proving some very basic facts necessary to support 
an inference of discrimination.  For instance, suppose – as a hypothetical – that a woman says she was not hired for 
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a particular job due to sex discrimination.  To make out her prima facie case, she must prove that she belongs to a 
protected class; was qualified for, and applied for, the job; and that she was rejected. She also must prove either that 
a man was hired for the job, or that the employer continued to seek other applicants after rejecting her.   
 
The employer then has a burden of production. It must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for 
the challenged employment action. For instance, in our hypothetical woman’s case, it might say that its interviewer 
was unimpressed with her educational background.  It does not, however, have to persuade anyone of this reason.  
 
Finally, the plaintiff has the opportunity to disprove the employer's articulated reason.  For instance, she 
might show that the company hired men with very similar educational backgrounds.  Alternatively, she can offer 
other evidence to show that the offered reason is a pretext for discrimination.  She might also show the jury the 
interviewer’s notes on her, and point out a little doodle of her in a short skirt under the heading “personality.” At the 
end of the case, the jury is instructed that it may find for the plaintiff if she has either disproved the employer's 
articulated reason or offered other evidence that the reason given is pretextual. The plaintiff retains the burden of 
proof, but the jury is instructed that acceptable proof to satisfy that burden can take one of several forms.  
 
This proof structure is useful in the typical employment discrimination case in which there is no “smoking 
gun.” (After all, most people who discriminate do not announce, or leave evidence, that they are doing so.)  The 
McDonnell Douglas model gets around that problem by forcing the employer to explain its actions. In this way, it 
narrows the litigation so it revolves around an actual reason offered by the employer, rather than forcing the plaintiff 
to disprove all conceivable, legitimate justifications for the employment action. It also gives the plaintiff a chance to 
take issue with a decisionmaking process to which she might otherwise have little, if any, access. 
 
The McDonnell Douglas model, useful as it is, has limits – and a mixed-motive case soon arose to test 
them. The case, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,21 led to a 1989 Supreme Court decision that significantly altered Title 
VII litigation.   
 
In Price Waterhouse, a firm denied partnership to a female candidate. There was some evidence that the 
decision was made both on the basis of her sex (an obviously illegitimate motive) and on the basis of her behavior at 
work (a legitimate motive). This is where McDonnell Douglas breaks down. The employer would satisfy its burden 
of production, coming forth with its legitimate reason for not making Hopkins partner: her behavior. Then the 
burden would be on Hopkins to disprove that reason, or show it was a pretext.  If she couldn’t, she would lose – 
even if she could show that there were other, illegitimate reasons for the denial.   
 
In sum, then, it seemed under McDonnell Douglas that Hopkins might lose even if the firm took her gender 
into account when making an employment decision—a clear Title VII violation.  Unless the Court took action, 
Hopkins would thus have a right – the right not to be discriminated against – but no remedy for its violation. And 
her employer would be given a free pass despite having committed a proven act of discrimination.   
 
That anomaly inspired the Supreme Court, in Price Waterhouse, to devise an alternative proof structure for 
mixed-motive cases. The proof structure the Court set forth in Price Waterhouse is not current law, however.  
Rather, it was superseded by Congress’s amendments to Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Those 
amendments made clear that discrimination with mixed motives is still discrimination:  it occurs whenever a 
prohibited characteristic was “a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice.”22  
 
The amendments also made clear that in the event an employer can show that it would have taken the same 
action without the discriminatory motive, the plaintiff cannot collect damages.  But the employer is not completely 
off the hook. If that defense is proven, the plaintiff can still hold the defendant liable and obtain injunctive relief and 
attorneys' fees, both potentially valuable remedies. 
 
As noted above, the 1991 amendments largely superseded Price Waterhouse. Yet one aspect of the decision 
remained relevant even after 1991. This is the issue that, last week, Desert Palace finally resolved. The Court's 
Price Waterhouse decision had been splintered, with the main opinion garnering only a plurality of four, not a 
majority of five. (Justices White and O’Connor each concurred in the judgment, but did not completely agree with 
the plurality’s reasoning.) 
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Justice O’Connor wrote that the burden should not shift to the employer unless and until the plaintiff could 
“show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision.”23 Justice O’Connor’s 
was the only opinion to mention the “direct evidence” requirement, which led to a variety of ambiguities. First, was 
the mention of “direct evidence” in her concurrence sufficient to make it part of the holding? Had the other Justices 
agreed with her, or did standard rules of vote counting make it the “narrowest ground” and therefore the holding?  
Second, had the 1991 amendments—which neither adopted nor rejected the “direct evidence” requirement—
rendered her concurrence, if it had been binding on lower courts, irrelevant?   
 
To add even more confusion, courts also disagreed as to what “direct evidence” meant. Literally, “direct 
evidence” means evidence that is sufficient to prove a fact without any inferences having to be drawn. In contrast, 
“circumstantial evidence” gives the fact-finder related facts from which it might conclude the existence of a 
particular, central fact. The testimony of a witness who saw a suspect commit murder is direct evidence. Evidence 
that a hair from the suspect’s head was found in the victim’s apartment near the body is circumstantial evidence 
from which a jury may draw an inference of guilt. 
 
In a murder case, that’s relatively straightforward. But what about a discrimination case? A few courts took 
“direct evidence” literally, dismissing the claims of plaintiffs who couldn’t come up with evidence of a virtual 
confession (written or oral) by their employer. Other courts, instead, said “direct evidence” of discrimination might 
simply be evidence showing animosity towards the protected class (for instance, women). In contrast, “indirect” 
evidence would show only that the employer’s proffered reason was false.  In both cases, a jury would need to draw 
inferences to decide the ultimate fact: whether the act was motivated by an illicit consideration of a protected 
characteristic. Some courts also said that the evidence, whether technically direct or circumstantial, needed to bear 
directly on the decisionmaking context in particular – it needed to be direct in the sense that it was immediate. Thus, 
if a boss said at a company picnic that women should be barefoot and pregnant in the kitchen, but did not jot down 
those thoughts in his interview notes, he might be off the hook for later failing to hire a pregnant woman. 
 
In Desert Palace, the Supreme Court achieved a simple, neat resolution of the “direct evidence” issue. It 
approved a jury instruction, in a mixed-motive case, that did not even mention the nature of the evidence plaintiffs 
must offer to carry their burden. Its reasoning was simple, too. The 1991 amendments had codified their own proof 
structure – one substantially different from that of Price Waterhouse. The amendments never mentioned any “direct 
evidence” requirement.  Nor did the original statute.  Therefore, there was no such requirement in the law. 
 
Justice Thomas – a former EEOC head with experience interpreting Title VII and a conservative justice 
with a penchant for narrowly interpreting statutes – wrote the opinion. He reasoned that the amended statute plainly 
says that a plaintiff “need only ‘demonstrate’ that an employer used a forbidden consideration with respect to ‘any 
employment practice.’” It also goes on to define “demonstrate” to mean “meet[ing] the burdens of production and 
persuasion.” Nowhere, he pointed out, does it impose a requirement that direct evidence be offered to prove the 
“forbidden consideration.”24 
 
The Court's decision in this case opens doors for more plaintiffs to get their cases to a jury. After Desert 
Palace, a plaintiff who has faced mixed-motive discrimination, and who can offer some proof of animus or hostility 
to his or her group status, may be able to win—or at least get before the jury. Prior to Desert Palace, in contrast, 
many courts would have required that proof not only be convincing, but also “direct” in order for a plaintiff’s claim 
to survive summary judgment.     
 
The change is obviously a good one: if a plaintiff can persuade a jury that there was discrimination, she 
should not also have to rely on a special kind of evidence to do so. Prior lower court cases on this issue – now 
overruled – unfairly hamstrung plaintiffs as to what kind of evidence they could present. These decisions required 
“smoking guns” even at a time when, as employers become more and more wary of litigation, such evidence is less 
and less likely to appear. Any modern employer who fails to put together employment files with an eye toward 
possible litigation is foolish.   
 
Unfortunately, however, much discrimination in the workplace continues. For instance, Costa’s isolation as 
the only woman doing her job should itself be troubling, though it was not directly at issue in her case. Doubtless, it 
affected her working conditions. Why, nearly four decades after Title VII was enacted, was Catherina Costa—a 
female heavy equipment operator—such an anomaly?   
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One answer is that Title VII has been ineffective in addressing occupational segregation—the channeling of 
men and women into separate careers and jobs. That is doubly a problem: not only is such segregation itself a 
system of discrimination, it is also closely linked to higher levels of sexual harassment and other forms of 




The Supreme Court’s decisions in Hibbs and Desert Palace were a welcome surprise, but by no means a panacea for 
all that ails women and other employees likely to face discrimination in the workplace. Significant problems of 
discrimination remain unresolved.  But further progress may be made next term, with the Court’s having already 
agreed to hear three employment law cases when it reconvenes in October.   
 
Those pending cases will address whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibits “reverse 
discrimination” (discrimination against younger employees in favor of older ones),25 whether an employer can 
refuse to hire a recovered drug addict under the Americans with Disabilities Act,26 and, finally, what the appropriate 
statute limitations is for race discrimination claims brought under Section 1981.27 
____________________ 
Joanna Grossman is an Associate Professor at the Hofstra University School of Law.The original version of this 
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